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WADING THROUGH THE “MORASS”: THE 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT RECOGNIZES A RIGHT 
TO CANDIDACY IN RANDALL V. SCOTT 
Abstract: On June 30, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit in Randall v. Scott held that the First Amendment affords protec-
tion to an individual based on the mere basis of that individual’s political 
candidacy. In so doing, the Randall court departed from other federal cir-
cuit courts, which had approached the issue by way of analogy to the First 
Amendment freedoms of speech and association. This Comment con-
cludes that the Eleventh Circuit’s novel approach, although well inten-
tioned, is only tenuously grounded in Supreme Court precedent. 
Introduction 
 “Precedent in the area of constitutional protection for candidacy 
can best be described as a legal morass,” opined the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit in its 2010 decision, Randall v. Scott.1 Ran-
dall tackles a question that has split the circuits: does the First Amend-
ment protect a public employee who is fired for announcing his 
candidacy for elective office?2 Charting new ground, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that the First Amendment affords protection to an individual 
based on the mere fact of that individual’s political candidacy.3 
 Part I of this Comment summarizes the Eleventh Circuit’s Randall 
decision.4 Part II examines the limited Supreme Court precedent on 
First Amendment protections for political candidacy and surveys the 
contradictory approaches that other circuits have taken in addressing 
the issue.5 Part III then evaluates the Eleventh Circuit’s novel ap-
proach, concluding that the Randall method, although well inten-
tioned, is tenuously grounded in Supreme Court precedent.6 
                                                                                                                      
1 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010). 
2 Id. at 705–10. 
3 Id. at 714. 
4 See infra notes 7–32 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 33–74 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 75–92 and accompanying text. 
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I. The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision in Randall v. Scott 
 In 2007, Earl Randall was the chief of staff to Jewel Scott, the Dis-
trict Attorney of Clayton County, Georgia.7 In late September, Randall 
declared his intent to run for chairman of the Clayton County Board of 
Commissioners.8 Within days, Jewel Scott informed Randall that her 
husband, Lee Scott, intended to run for chairman as well and that he 
was angered by Randall’s candidacy, believing that it would split voters 
who wanted to vote against the incumbent candidate.9 In the months 
that followed, Lee Scott allegedly pressured his wife to fire Randall un-
less he backed out of the race.10 Jewel Scott told Randall that he was 
“making life difficult” for her and warned him that if he stayed in the 
race he might lose his job.11 In December, five days after receiving an 
invitation to a fundraiser for Randall’s campaign, Jewel Scott fired 
him.12 
 Randall brought an action in Georgia state court asserting a First 
Amendment retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jew-
el Scott in her individual and official capacities.13 Scott removed the 
case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Ran-
dall’s complaint failed to state a First Amendment violation and, alter-
natively, that she was immune from suit.14 The district court granted 
Scott’s motion to dismiss.15 The court reasoned that, under a height-
ened pleading standard applicable to § 1983 claims, “the mere fact that 
Randall decided to run for political office and held an event in connec-
tion with his candidacy is not enough to trigger First Amendment pro-
tection.”16 Randall appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit.17 
                                                                                                                      
7 Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 703 (11th Cir. 2010). 
8 Id. 




13 See Randall, 610 F.3d at 704. Randall also brought a tortious interference claim 
against Lee Scott, which the district court dismissed without prejudice. Order Granting 
Motion to Dismiss at 1, Randall v. Scott, No. 1:08-cv-2910-TCB (N.D. Ga. May 20, 2009), 
ECF No. 18. Ultimately, neither Randall nor Scott won the election; the incumbent, Eldrin 
Bell, was re-elected. See Bill Rankin, Court Revives Lawsuit Against Former DA, Atlanta J.-
Const., July 1, 2010, at B3. 
14 Randall, 610 F.3d at 704. 
15 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 13, at 1. 
16 Id. at 14. 
17 Randall, 610 F.3d at 705. 
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 On June 30, 2010, a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit is-
sued its opinion in Randall v. Scott.18 The panel held that the district 
court erred in applying a heightened pleading standard to Randall’s 
§ 1983 complaint and remanded the case.19 Because the lower court 
“[made] explicit” that Scott’s motion to dismiss would have been 
granted under any pleading standard, the panel then addressed the 
First Amendment question as well.20 
 The panel concluded that, contrary to the district court’s analysis, 
the “mere fact” of Randall’s political candidacy did trigger sufficient 
First Amendment protection to overcome Scott’s motion to dismiss.21 
Although there was no U.S. Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit prece-
dent squarely analogous to Randall’s situation, the court stated that 
“every case addressing the issue has found at least some constitutional 
protection” for candidacy.22 At the Supreme Court level, several cases 
had addressed restrictions on ballot access (such as large filing fees) 
and explained that “[f]ar from recognizing candidacy as a fundamental 
right, we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate’s access 
to the ballot does not of itself compel close scrutiny.”23 Nevertheless, 
the Randall court opined, these cases still suggested that “political can-
didacy is entitled to at least a modicum of constitutional protection.”24 
 Within the Eleventh Circuit, all relevant precedent involved pub-
lic employee plaintiffs discharged for supporting a candidate running 
for office----not employees discharged for their own pursuit of elective 
office.25 Those cases applied the Supreme Court’s Elrod-Branti stan-
dard, which asks the court to balance a discharged employee’s First 
Amendment right to support a candidate with the state’s interest in 
office loyalty.26 Each of those cases, the Randall court observed, 
                                                                                                                      
 
18 See generally id. 
19 Id. at 705–10. 
20 Id. at 710, 710–14. 
21 See id. at 704, 710. 
22 Id. at 713. 
23 Randall, 610 F.3d at 711 (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982)) (al-
teration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Bullock v. Carter 405 U.S. 
134, 142–43 (1972). 
24 See Randall, 610 F.3d at 712. 
25 See id. at 712–13 (discussing Epps v. Watson, 492 F.3d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373, 377–78 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
26 See Epps, 492 F.3d at 1242, 1244 (applying balancing test to dismissal of tax commis-
sioner clerk for supporting newly elected commissioner’s opponent, where clerk was not in 
decision-making role); Terry, 866 F.2d at 377–78 (applying Elrod-Branti balancing test to 
dismissal of public employees who were replaced by persons supporting newly elected 
sheriff, and reasoning that the “determination . . . depends on the actual responsibilities of 
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“found that the discharged employee had some constitutional protec-
tion.”27 
 The Randall court co-opted the Elrod-Branti balancing test for Earl 
Randall’s situation, reasoning that the analysis is “no different for a re-
striction on candidacy than [for] a restriction on candidate support.”28 
A plaintiff’s candidacy cannot be burdened because a state of-
ficial wishes to discourage that candidacy without a whisper of 
valid state interest. An interest in candidacy, and expression of 
political views without interference from state officials who 
wish to discourage that interest and expression, lies at the core 
of values protected by the First Amendment.29 
Because Scott fired Randall for purely personal reasons, the state had 
no interest in preventing Randall’s political candidacy.30 And, as the 
Eleventh Circuit determined, Randall’s decision to run for office de-
served some degree of First Amendment protection.31 Applying the 
balancing test, the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of Ran-
dall’s complaint.32 
II. Contextualizing Randall 
 Given the First Amendment’s apparent silence on political candi-
dacy, it is not surprising that courts have yet to develop a uniform ap-
proach to the issue.33 The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the 
political candidacy question directly, but its jurisprudence regarding 
elections and ballot access implies that political candidacy announce-
ments do not receive First Amendment protection.34 Nonetheless, 
when facing arguments for the extension of First Amendment protec-
tions to political candidacy, most federal courts have turned not to Su-
                                                                                                                      
each position and the relationship of each to the sheriff”); see also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 
507, 517 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976). 
27 Randall, 610 F.3d at 713. 
28 See id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 714. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 See U.S. Const. amend. I. Compare Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982) 
(refusing to “recogniz[e] candidacy as a fundamental right”), with Randall v. Scott, 610 
F.3d 701, 713 (11th Cir. 2010) (“An interest in candidacy . . . lies at the core of values pro-
tected by the First Amendment.”). 
34 See Clements, 457 U.S. at 963; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142–43 (1972). 
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preme Court jurisprudence, but instead to the freedoms of expression 
and association found in the First Amendment.35 
A. Supreme Court Precedent: The Viewpoint-Neutral Cases 
 Two cases form the backbone of the U.S. Supreme Court’s political 
candidacy jurisprudence: Bullock v. Carter, a 1972 case, and Clements v. 
Fashing, a 1982 case.36 Each addressed the constitutionality of Texas stat-
utes that restricted political candidacy rights, but were viewpoint-neutral 
because they applied to all persons holding a certain position rather 
than to a discrete individual or group’s speech.37 Considering a chal-
lenge to the large filing fees required as a condition to having one’s 
name on the ballot, the Court in Bullock held that there is no “funda-
mental status to candidacy” and that the “existence of such barriers does 
not of itself compel close scrutiny.”38 But because “the rights of voters 
and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation,” 
and because the statute had such a substantial impact on the class of 
voters most likely to choose a candidate who could not afford the ballot 
fee, the Court struck down the statute on equal protection grounds.39 
 Ten years later, in Clements, the Court affirmed the Bullock princi-
ple that there is no fundamental right to candidacy and upheld a provi-
sion of the Texas Constitution that required state officeholders to re-
sign if they wished to run for another elective office.40 The restriction 
on candidacy was minimal, the Court reasoned, and therefore did not 
have the same substantial impact on voters that invalidated the filing 
fee statute in Bullock.41 Bullock and Clements each dealt with a viewpoint-
neutral statute—not retaliatory action, as in Randall—and neither ex-
plicitly precluded First Amendment protections for political candi-
dacy.42 Neither case, however, supports the proposition that candidacy 
enjoys per se constitutional protection.43 
                                                                                                                      
35 See, e.g., Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247, 1256–58 (10th Cir. 1999); Newcomb v. 
Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1977). 
36 See generally Clements, 457 U.S. 957; Bullock, 405 U.S. 134. 
37 See generally Clements, 457 U.S. 957; Bullock, 405 U.S. 134; Randall, 610 F.3d 701. 
38 Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142–43. 
39 See id. at 144–45, 149. 
40 See Clements, 457 U.S. at 960, 963, 972–73 (quoting Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142–43). 
41 See id. at 971–72; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144. 
42 See Clements, 457 U.S. at 963; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142–43. 
43 See Clements, 457 U.S. at 963; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142–43. 
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B. The Expression/Association Framework 
 Many lower federal courts considering whether to extend First 
Amendment protections to announcements of political candidacy have 
applied the Supreme Court’s expression and association frameworks.44 
The district court in Randall was among them.45 Indeed, the court split 
Earl Randall’s arguments for potential First Amendment protection 
into two categories: “(1) political patronage—whether he was subjected 
to an adverse employment action based on his political beliefs or party 
affiliation, and (2) employee expression—whether he was subjected to 
an adverse action based on his political speech.”46 This framework, ac-
cording to an earlier Eleventh Circuit case, adequately encompassed 
the variety of situations in which the exercise of a First Amendment 
right may be the basis for a public employee’s discharge.47 It also accu-
rately reflected the case law in other jurisdictions.48 
1. The Expression Cases 
 The freedom of expression cases typically involve public employees 
who have been subjected to adverse employment actions based on po-
litical speech.49 In 1968 in Pickering v. Board of Education, for example, 
the U.S. Supreme Court “unequivocally rejected” the notion that public 
employees could be compelled to give up their rights, as citizens, to 
comment on matters of public interest.50 Pickering created a balancing 
test “between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in comment-
ing upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”51 
 Plaintiffs in several federal circuit courts have successfully argued 
that political candidacy falls within the ambit of Pickering.52 The U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have each 
                                                                                                                      
44 See, e.g., Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1256–58; Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 828. 
45 See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 13, at 8–16. 
46 Randall, 610 F.3d at 714; Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 13, at 8. 
47 See Terry, 866 F.2d at 375; Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 13, at 8. 
48 See Terry, 866 F.2d at 375; Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1256–58; Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 828. 
49 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 
1256–58; Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 828. 
50 391 U.S. at 568; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (“The First 
Amendment protects a public employee’s right . . . to speak as a citizen addressing matters of 
public concern.”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (reaffirming the Pickering test). 
51 391 U.S. at 568. 
52 See, e.g., Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1257; Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 828–29. 
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determined that the declaration of candidacy is a form of protected ex-
pression, at least in certain circumstances.53 In the 1999 case of Jantzen v. 
Hawkins, for example, the Tenth Circuit held that a deputy sheriff’s 
candidacy against his boss constituted “political speech” that “undoubt-
edly relat[ed] to matters of public concern” and therefore commanded 
application of the Pickering balancing test.54 Similarly, in the 1977 case of 
Newcomb v. Brennan, the Seventh Circuit considered the case of a deputy 
city attorney who was dismissed when he announced his candidacy for 
Congress against the wishes of his supervisor.55 The Newcomb court ruled 
that the plaintiff’s interest in running for office is not entitled to consti-
tutional protection per se, but nonetheless decided that, because the 
employee had been fired based on “the content of a communicative 
act,” he was therefore protected by the First Amendment.56 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in contrast, has 
repeatedly held that a declaration of candidacy does not constitute po-
litical expression demanding First Amendment protection.57 In the 
1997 case of Carver v. Davis, the Sixth Circuit considered the discharge 
of a deputy clerk because she announced her decision to run for her 
boss’s office.58 The court determined the announcement of candidacy 
to be “neutral in terms of the First Amendment” because it was separate 
from the plaintiff’s political beliefs and was not an expression thereof.59 
Declining to apply Pickering, the court opined that “[t]he First Amend-
ment does not require that an official . . . nourish the viper in the 
nest.”60 In 2008 in Greenwell v. Parsley, an en banc panel of the Sixth Cir-
cuit reaffirmed Carver on similar facts.61 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1257; Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 111–12 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that deputy sheriff’s pursuit of office against his employer was protected by the 
First Amendment); Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 828. 
54 Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1257 (ultimately holding that the deputy’s interest in expression 
did not outweigh the sheriff’s interest in effective law enforcement under Pickering). 
55 See generally 558 F.2d 825. 
56 Id. at 828–29. The Newcomb court also stressed the ad hoc nature of the firing, dis-
tinguishing it from the viewpoint-neutral discrimination considered in Bullock. See Bullock, 
405 U.S. at 137–44 (addressing constitutionality of Texas filing-fee scheme); Newcomb, 558 
F.2d at 828. 
57 See Greenwell v. Parsley, 541 F.3d 401, 403–04 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
64 (2009); Carver v. Davis, 104 F.3d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1997). 
58 See 104 F.3d at 848. 
59 Id. at 852; cf. Murphy v. Cockrell, 505 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2007) (determining that, al-
though the “mere fact” of candidacy was not protected speech, subsequent speech within 
campaign was protected). 
60 Carver, 104 F.3d at 853. 
61 541 F.3d at 402–03. 
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2. The Association Cases 
 Sometimes dubbed “political patronage” cases, freedom of associa-
tion cases involve employees who have been subjected to adverse em-
ployment actions based on political beliefs or party affiliation.62 The 
regime began with the 1976 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in El-
rod v. Burns, which made it unconstitutional to condition a public em-
ployee’s continued employment on providing support for a favored 
political party.63 The Elrod standard, as refined by the Court in 1980 in 
Branti v. Finkel, requires the state authority to “demonstrate that party 
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance 
of the office.”64 If the state cannot demonstrate such an interest, then it 
may not take adverse actions against public employees.65 
 Attempts to extend associational protection to political candidacy 
have been fewer and less successful than those based on expression.66 
Some courts have latched onto the Supreme Court’s viewpoint-neutral 
cases that declined to recognize candidacy as a fundamental right.67 
Another relied on the logical argument that “[t]he right to political 
affiliation does not encompass the mere right to affiliate with one-
self.”68 On these grounds, the Tenth Circuit in Jantzen determined that, 
although a candidate’s right to free speech was implicated by his dis-
missal, his right to free association was not.69 Conversely, in 2008 in Jor-
dan v. Ector County, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled 
that campaign activities, if not the declaration of candidacy itself, repre-
sented “outward signs” of political affiliation and brought a deputy 
clerk’s candidacy within the ambit of the First Amendment’s associa-
tional protections.70 
3. The Eleventh Circuit’s Rejection of Expression and Association 
Frameworks 
 The district court in Randall ruled that, under either the expres-
sion or association framework, Earl Randall’s complaint required dis-
                                                                                                                      
62 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976). 
63 Id. 
64 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980); see Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363. 
65 See Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. 
66 See, e.g., Jordan v. Ector County, 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2008); Jantzen, 188 F.3d 
at 1252. 
67 See, e.g., Carver, 104 F.3d at 850–51; Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 828. 
68 Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1252. 
69 See id. 
70 516 F.3d at 298. 
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missal.71 In rejecting that conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit also implic-
itly rejected the expression/association frameworks for political candi-
dacy.72 Randall’s decision to run for office enjoyed constitutional pro-
tection in and of itself, irrespective of the status of that decision as 
protected speech or association.73 That being the case, the Eleventh 
Circuit co-opted the Elrod-Branti test and applied it to Randall’s case, 
holding that his termination had to be supported by a state interest of 
sufficient importance.74 
III. Randall and the Third Path: Political Candidacy 
Announcements Enjoy First Amendment Protection 
A. The Problematic Logic of the Third Path 
 In rejecting the district court’s expression/association approach, 
the Eleventh Circuit attempted to forge a third path: that of recogniz-
ing political candidacy as per se protected under the First Amend-
ment.75 Although that principle has been stated in other contexts, no 
court has recognized constitutional protection for candidacy in a case 
squarely similar to Randall.76 The Eleventh Circuit thus broke new 
ground.77 But the challenge of advancing the argument is evident in 
the Eleventh Circuit’s somewhat tenuous grounding in authority.78 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s use of Supreme Court authority regarding 
the lack of a “fundamental right” to candidacy, for example, is sus-
pect.79 Most cases cite the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1972 decision, Bullock 
v. Carter, and the Court’s 1982 decision, Clements v. Fashing, for the 
proposition that an individual has no constitutional interest in running 
for office.80 Randall argues instead that the Supreme Court left the 
door slightly open for constitutional protection—that there is “at least a 
                                                                                                                      
71 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 13, at 10. 
72 See Randall, 610 F.3d at 714. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 711, 714; Branti, 445 U.S. at 507; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363. 
75 See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 713 (11th Cir. 2010). 
76 See, e.g., Flinn v. Gordon, 775 F.2d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting in dicta that 
plaintiff “certainly had a constitutional right to run for office . . . .”); Magill v. Lynch, 560 
F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1977) (“Candidacy is a First Amendment freedom.”). 
77 Compare Randall, 610 F.3d at 710–12, with Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 
(1982), and Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1977). 
78 See Randall, 610 F.3d at 710–12. 
79 See Clements, 457 U.S. at 963; Bullock v. Carter 405 U.S. 134, 142–43 (1972); Randall, 
610 F.3d at 710–12. 
80 See, e.g., Carver v. Davis, 104 F.3d 847, 851 (6th Cir. 1997); Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 829. 
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modicum” of protection remaining between the lines of the Court’s 
seemingly damning language.81 That argument may well be correct, 
but it does not ring with authority.82 It is revealing that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s most powerful statement in support of a right to candidacy—
that “an interest in candidacy . . . lies at the core of values protected by 
the First Amendment” —echoes the 1977 case Newcomb v. Brennan.83 In 
Newcomb, the Seventh Circuit used nearly the exact same language in 
ruling that there was no per se protection for candidacy—only protec-
tion for the announcement of candidacy as a form of expression.84 
B. A Right to Candidacy Moving Forward 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s intention seems admirable: simply put, pub-
lic employees like Earl Randall should be able to declare their candidacy 
for office without fear that their employer will terminate them without 
a good reason.85 As long as the case law is unsettled (or settled against 
First Amendment protections, as in the Sixth Circuit), public employers 
may be able to fire any subordinate who seeks elective office, regardless 
of the state’s interest in preventing or punishing their candidacy.86 As 
the Randall decision noted, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves 
to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some 
theoretical, correlative effect on voters.”87 If public employees can be 
fired for the mere fact of their candidacy without justification or reper-
cussion, voters will be deprived of choices—often, the choice to vote for 
a candidate uniquely qualified for a position by virtue of having worked 
within that office.88 
 To ensure fairness to all public employees and to resolve jurispru-
dential conflict, the Supreme Court should decide whether political 
candidacy enjoys First Amendment protection.89 The Court could 
                                                                                                                      
 
81 Randall, 610 F.3d at 712. 
82 See Clements, 457 U.S. at 963; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142–43; Randall, 610 F.3d at 710–12. 
83 See Randall, 610 F.3d at 712; Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 829 (“[The] plaintiff’s interest in 
running for [elective office] and thereby expressing his political views . . . lies at the core of the 
values protected by the First Amendment.”(emphasis added)). 
84 See Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 829. 
85 See Randall, 610 F.3d at 713. 
86 See Greenwell v. Parsley, 541 F.3d 401, 403–04 (6th Cir. 2008); Carver, 104 F.3d at 853. 
87 Randall, 610 F.3d at 711 (quoting Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142–43). 
88 See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144–45, 149. 
89 See generally Randall, 610 F.3d 701. The Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to 
address the issue by denying the Greenwell petition for certiorari in 2009. See generally 
Greenwell, 541 F.3d 401, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 64 (2009). The facts in Greenwell, however, 
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ground its reasoning in a characterization of a candidacy announce-
ment as an act of speech, definitively placing such cases within the am-
bit of the Pickering balancing analysis.90 Or, as in Randall, it could affirm 
the existence of a right to candidacy, in and of itself, and prescribe a 
balancing test to ensure that an official’s actions are adequately 
grounded in legitimate state interests.91 Either stance would be prefer-
able to the current confusion.92 
Conclusion 
 As the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Randall, the traditional ex-
pression/association framework of First Amendment analysis provides 
insufficient protection for a public employee’s interest in running for 
office. The application of that framework has resulted in open conflict 
among the circuits. The Eleventh Circuit’s rejection of that approach, 
in favor of recognizing some constitutional protection for political can-
didacy per se, not only conflicts with other circuits, but is also in appar-
ent tension with the Supreme Court’s political candidacy jurispru-
dence. Until the Supreme Court resolves the issue, public employees 
may be unfairly and unconstitutionally punished for their participation 
in the political process. 
Kevin C. Quigley 
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made it likely that the state would have prevailed in a balancing test even if the Court had 
recognized the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. See generally id. (considering sheriff’s 
termination of deputy sheriff who intended to run against him in his bid for re-election). 
Earl Randall’s situation was distinct because he was fired for personal reasons unrelated to 
the state’s legitimate interest in office loyalty. See Randall, 610 F.3d at 714. 
90 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Newcomb, 558 F.2d at 829. 
91 See Randall, 610 F.3d at 713–14. 
92 See Clements, 457 U.S. at 963; Randall, 610 F.3d at 713; Carver, 104 F.3d at 853. More-
over, either stance would heed the Supreme Court’s own admonition that the First 
Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of cam-
paigns for political office.” See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1971). 
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